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Luis Maira Aguirre* 
 
Relations Between Latin America 
and the United States: 
Balance and Prospects** 
 
The Caribbean and Central America at the origin of the United States 
imperial expansion 
If the relations between the United States and Latin America are studied from a historical 
perspective, they appear to be considerably more stable and to have greater continuity than is 
suggested by an examination based on specific circumstances. Since the Latin American 
countries consolidated their independence from the Spanish Empire in the second and third 
decades of the nineteenth century, their links with the leading country in the north of the 
hemisphere have been asymmetrical, dependent and of secondary importance for policy-
makers in Washington. Exceptions to this are only found under certain “crisis situations” that 
quite occasionally take place in Latin American countries. The rest of the time, a routine course 
prevails in which decisions are left to middle rank officials at the State Department who handles 
the situations faced by the diverse governments of the south on a case-by-case basis. 
Very early on, those in charge of defining foreign policy established the guiding principle for 
their conduct: combining carrots and sticks, following the experience that the villagers of the 
thirteen colonies located along the Atlantic applied to get their donkeys to move; in other words, 
a stimulus for the beast to achieve an appropriate pace, coupled with punishment if the owner’s 
instructions weren’t obeyed. The only thing that has varied from one stage to another is the 
proportion of incentives and punishments. But at the basis of the realistic thinking that serves as 
theoretical framework for the foreign decisions of US bureaucrats in their international policy, 
the conviction has always existed that a great power must impose its criteria on the lesser 
nations, and that in order to achieve this goal it is the behavior of the country in question that 
determines the type of treatment it receives. 
The asymmetry between the two areas has its roots in the final phases of the colonial period 
experienced by Anglo-Saxon America and Latin America
1
. United States historians stress the 
individualistic nature of the conquest and colonization of North America. Louis Hartz
2
 has made 
famous the expression “fragment society” to point out that the colonies of the eastern United 
States were populated on the basis of individual contracts fulfilled by modern colonization 
companies that transported colonists across the Atlantic who “carried capitalism in their bones” 
and sought to reproduce the conditions of an England that was already readying the first 
industrial revolution. In Spanish and Portuguese America, on the other hand, there was a 
mixture between religious evangelization and imperial domination that gave rise to societies 
which were much more backward and further removed from the capitalist spirit. 
Contrary to what is also believed, over the course of the nineteenth century the United 
States did not have a policy of imperial expansion that sought to build colonies or dominions far 
from its territory. The celebrated 1796 Farewell Address of the first president, George 
Washington, espoused an isolationist policy that would give the United States the advantages of 
not participating in intense European conflicts, seen as pointless, stressing its potential as “the 
first of the new nations” and assuring its inhabitants that they should safeguard the advantage 
of living in the best-organized society on earth. In fact, the entire nineteenth century was 
devoted to expanding its domestic frontiers until attaining the gigantic territory that was rounded 
out with the purchase of Alaska from Russia in 1867. The acquisition of Louisiana from 
Napoleon and of Florida from Spain, the integration of Oregon, and above all the enormous 
surfaces wrenched away from Mexico in California, Texas, Arizona and New Mexico in the war 
of 1846 and the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo in 1848, were, along with the conquest of the 
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West, a means towards developing a continental-size country (from the Atlantic to the Pacific 
Ocean) and generating the material basis of the future superpower. 
The Monroe doctrine of 1823 that rejected any presence by the European powers on 
American soil was thus a true “reservation clause” to make future operations possible
3
. All the 
invasion and annexation projects for Cuba or Jamaica proposed mainly by the Southern states 
were rejected at that time of prevailing internal tensions, only solved by the Civil War and the 
victory of the North in 1865. As of that moment the foreign policy of the United States began to 
be constructed, establishing the bases for the first imperial expansion which took place via the 
war against Spain in 1898. 
By that time the United States had turned into the world’s top industrial power (a status it 
achieved in 1894), and the reticence with regard to an expanded international presence began 
to be dispelled. US imperial power was established in stages, and its first circle of extension 
encompassed Central America and the Caribbean
4
. The presence of Theodore Roosevelt in the 
White House established an entire new phase, tougher and more aggressive –the so-called “Big 
Stick” policy. The virtual annexation of Puerto Rico was followed by the intervention in Cuba 
through the Platt Amendment, and later by the active presence of the Marines, who landed in 
the Dominican Republic, Haiti and Nicaragua in open support of US investments. In the first 
decades of the twentieth century, iron-clad protectorates were established that included the US 
administration of ports, customs and tax services to ensure the collection of pending debts 
through occupation processes that extended over lengthy periods. In the language of the time, 
“dollar diplomacy” was intensively combined with “gunboat diplomacy”.  
Things changed only when the world context was modified. In 1933 president Franklin 
Delano Roosevelt, under pressure from the effects of the Great Depression, and with a horizon 
of tension that would lead to the Second World War, sought to establish a more cooperative 
relationship with Latin American countries which would ensure a good support for the United 
States in case of conflict with the Axis powers, as it actually happened. This gave rise to the 
“Good Neighbor Policy”, proclaimed at the Pan-American Conference of Montevideo, which 
suspended all forcible action and withdrew all US forces from the area
5
. Ensuingly, situations 
that in another context would have led to a very tough response, such as the oil expropriation by 
president Lázaro Cárdenas in Mexico in March 1938 or the victory of the Popular Front in Chile 
in October of that same year, led to seldom seen negotiations and adjustments. 
It could thus be said that phase one of the active imperial presence of the United States in 
Latin America constituted its most flagrant stage, and the one witnessing the most systematic 
political and economic intervention, which did not exclude, at least temporarily, the occupation 
of countries. The end of this period was characterized by a more open attitude, as a 
consequence of its global interests, and this caused the majority of the countries to indeed back 
the Allies during the following conflict, in particular the United States, by delivering their raw 
materials and strategic products at preferential rates and, in the case of the bigger nations like 
Brazil and Mexico, even contributing with a small amount of troops to the war fronts. 
 
Latin America and the containment policy during the Cold War 
Between 1945 and 1989 the Cold War stage marks a second period in relations, more recent 
and more decisive in determining the profile and content of current policies
6
. The emergence of 
the bipolar world and the systematic conflict with the Soviet Union and the communist camp 
shaped a new profile of alliances and conflicts in which “the clash of civilizations”, in the sense 
accorded to this term by the neoconservative expert Norman Podhoretz
7
 of choosing between 
the United States or the USSR lifestyle, was the cornerstone for calibrating, over almost five 
decades, the treatment received by Latin American countries. 
The end of the Second World War coincided with the period of greatest power ever attained 
by the United States in its entire history. Habituated to having the advantage of not waging wars 
on its own territory, and to turning them into a factor of economic reinforcement, in 1945, with 
less than 5% of the world’s population, the United States had 35% of the world’s GDP, 47% of 
its total industrial capacity, 22% of the exports in the world economy, and 50% of the stock of 
private investment. In such a context, the disciplining of Latin American economies operated in 
tandem with a strong political control over their governments. The previous and lax Pan-
American system was turned in 1948 into the Organization of American States (OAS), 
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considered by its critics as the “the United States Ministry of Colonies for Latin America”. One 
year earlier, in September 1947, the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio 
Treaty), the first of the regional military alliances created by the United States, which preceded 
NATO by two years, had been set up in Rio de Janeiro. According to article 5 of this legal 
instrument, the signers of the text were to provide one another with mutual assistance with their 
military forces if one of the participants happened to be the object of “an extra-continental 
aggression”. In this way the Latin American countries became, in advance, compelled to 
support the United States in case of an eventual conflict with the Soviet Union –a Third World 
War– which most of the experts in Washington considered inevitable toward the mid-1950s. A 
Convention for the proscription of communism from the hemisphere agreed on at the Caracas 
Conference in 1954 was further added to this. As never before, Latin America recognized it was 
part of a tight and solid block of support for US foreign policy. 
By then Washington’s international activity had, in turn, become much more complex. Until 
1939 there was “one” US foreign policy which the State Department coordinated in full. From 
1945 onwards, instead, a series of foreign strategies handled by diverse government agencies 
operated. The first one to become manifest was the international economic policy that 
originated the main preparatory designs for the Teheran, Yalta and Potsdam conferences 
between 1943 and 1945 at which the victors defined the spheres of influence and the new world 
order. The second in importance was the defense and security policy that had its rules of the 
game included in the National Security Act of 1947. But later numerous other specific fields 
appeared, such as the agricultural foreign policy for the placement of its enormous farm 
surpluses; the foreign policy for energy to ensure the supply of oil and control over its sources in 
the developing countries; the foreign policy for transport to ensure the preeminence of its 
corporations in the aviation and maritime field. The foreign policies related to the environment 
and to social development irrupted later. In all of these new spheres the Department of State 
has very little say, so that the application of the United States’ foreign interests now 
corresponds to an intricate maze of departments and decision-making circuits and agencies in 
which the dynamics of cooperation and conflict crisscross
8
. 
Latin America has been one of the settings for this complexity, which in some cases has led 
to a given country concretely deciding to go beyond the diplomatic sphere: this happened in the 
1980s with Honduras on the occasion of the Central American crisis. The country, the poorest in 
the subregion, was considered almost as an “aircraft carrier on land” for the mobilization –under 
the dictates of the Department of Defense– of US influences and resources in the civil conflicts 
in Nicaragua, El Salvador and Guatemala. 
Over the course of recent decades the Latin American area saw a rigorous application of the 
strategy of containment that served as the basis of the US international design for the Cold War. 
The diverse national situations were put through the sieve of their impact on the global balance 
between the United States and the Soviet Union. For the same reason, another very important 
structural variation in Washington’s decision-making was the distinction between situations of 
normalcy and crisis situations, the latter corresponding to circumstances of a rise by left-wing 
forces or of a conduct close to Soviet positions in a given country. While normal situations 
generated very few initiatives and were handled by a Country Director, a third-level official who 
led the “desk” for a Latin American country, crisis situations originated what was known as a 
test case. In such circumstances the decision-making level rose and coordination was 
increased, so as to measure the impact of all actions promoted by the US government. 
In the five decades of the Cold War there were only two considerable situations emanating 
from the region that had an overall impact on US strategy. The first one was the Cuban 
Revolution of 1959, that embodied the worst nightmares of the Department of State by leading a 
country of the hemisphere to communism and a direct association with the Soviet Union
9
 
(curiously, the situation of Cuba continues to be the object of the same restrictive policies, such 
as the economic embargo and the Helms-Burton Amendment following the end of the Cold War 
and the abandonment of its content in the entire rest of the world). The second one was the 
great political crisis that burst out in Central America after the toppling of the dictator Anastasio 
Somoza Jr. in Nicaragua in July 1979
10
. Like a cluster bomb, this situation spread to 
neighboring countries, linking up with other bloody internal conflicts that opposed military forces 
backed by the United States against the armed organizations of the Farabundo Martí National 
Liberation Front (FMLN) in El Salvador and the Guatemalan guerrilla groups gathered in the 
Union for Guatemalan National Resistance (URNG). In this case, a theoretical proposal 
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formulated by Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, known as the “domino effect”, was applied. 
Kissinger maintained that in the struggle against communism there were no second or third-
level countries, since the downfall of a small country under Soviet influence could generate a 
linked effect of new, more important losses, making it necessary to establish barriers and avoid 
communist takeovers in every spot. 
Other significant cases in those years, also dominated by the fear of an expansion of 
communism, were: the toppling of the regime of Colonel Jacobo Arbenz in Guatemala that put 
an end to the so-called Democratic Revolution launched in 1944 under the accusation of a 
rising influence of the country’s small Communist Party, but actually triggered by the threat of an 
agrarian reform that could deprive the powerful US corporation United Fruit Company of part of 
its lands; later, the invasion of the Dominican Republic in 1965 to contain the possible Cuban 
influence on the government led by Colonel Francisco Camaño in the political aftermath of the 
assassination of the emblematic dictator Rafael Leónidas Trujillo in that country; and finally, the 
active US participation in the sharp political struggle that preceded the Chilean coup d’état of 
September 11 1973, which put an end to democracy in that country and cost the life of 
president Salvador Allende. 
In general it may be stated that the organizations that formulate foreign policy toward Latin 
America normally have not attempted to work with articulated visions or specific projects. This 
only happened when they felt their interests were being affected globally by some process in 
the region or when they attained a certain electoral impact. In those cases, proposals such as 
president John F. Kennedy’s “Alliance For Progress”, the Human Rights Policy of the Carter 
administration, or the Initiative for the Americas of president George Bush Sr. which Bill Clinton 
later turned into the proposal for the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), which was 
scheduled to come into being in 2005 and is currently under complex discussion, were 
formulated. These more ambitious visions usually came into conflict with the more routine-
bound pace of the career officials at the Department of State, and as a consequence they did 
not come into practice. 
If these episodes are excluded, the remainder of the relations between the United States 
and Latin America was of a normalcy based on subordination or observance by the countries of 
the region of the guidelines set by the policies imposed by Washington. Although there has 
been a permanent statement of espousal by the occupants of the White House of the principles 
of representative democracy expressly enshrined in the charter of the OAS, in practice the 
United States helped establish or backed many dictatorial regimes that openly diverged from 
those criteria, under the argument of making their national interests prevail. The most significant 
example of this line was the sponsorship of the so-called “national security military 
dictatorships”, much more repressive and systematic than the traditional kind. On the basis of 
conceptions emerging from the National War College of the United States, the so-called 
National Security Doctrine –a counter-ideology to communism that advised the military to take 
over political power and to refund in their countries institutions of a conservative nature– was 
imposed. In the 1960s and 1970s, military regimes which acted in close coordination in the 
design of state terrorism were set up in Brazil, Bolivia, Uruguay, Argentina and Chile
11
 to root 
out dissident political and social organizations and reorganize the economy according to the 
guidelines of a neoliberal model. 
 
The changing post-Cold War and globalization setting 
As of the end of the Cold War, relations between the United States and Latin America 
entered a third stage, the rationale for which is also completely different from the previous ones. 
The period of the post-Cold War era and of globalization originated this “epochal change” so 
stressed by historians, which has brought about huge effects in the style and contents of 
hemispheric policy. From the rigorously bipolar order of the blocs’ policy we went on to a 
heterogeneous situation in which the international system is unipolar in the military and 
communicational spheres, but considerably more open and multipolar in the economic and 
political fields
12
. In a subordinated region such as Latin America, Washington’s power over it 
was felt in full force.  
Beyond the equivocal effect that might by suggested by the search for a regional Free Trade 
Agreement, the marginality and lack of significance of the countries located south of the Rio 
Bravo has been manifest, leading to the fragmentation and opaqueness of the United States 
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policy. The change in the image of the world after the end of the Soviet Union and the 
communist world, and the immense scientific and technological transformations that have 
accompanied the third industrial revolution, have at the same time generated a nonplusing 
effect on Latin American leadership groups, which have seen these immense changes merely 
as a crisis caused by a specific situation and awaited without success for things to return to the 
previous normalcy. 
For its part, Latin America as a region has experienced transformations of vast size and is 
now very different from what it was barely two decades ago. The dictatorships have 
disappeared, and democratic regimes have been set up with quite transparent electoral 
processes as regards the generation of authorities. But this has not entailed perceptible 
changes in the living conditions of the big majorities, and for various and complex reasons a 
situation of disenchantment with democracy has been reached. The Argentine analyst 
Guillermo O’Donnell has accurately spoken of “low-intensity democracies” with governments, 
parliaments and political parties graded poorly by society, generating a process of increasing 
abstention in elections and a loss of legitimacy of their work. 
At the same time, the region has become even poorer and more unequal, accentuating its 
worst historical features. According to figures of the Economic Commission for Latin America 
(ECLA), in 1980 130 million people lived in poverty in the Latin American and Caribbean 
countries. In 1990, after the so-called “lost decade” and the problems caused by the outbreak of 
the foreign debt crisis, they had risen to 190 million. In 2002, despite the initial expectations of 
an improvement of the situation in the 1990s, the number had again increased, to 210 million 
people living in poverty. This means that today 44% of the inhabitants of Latin America are 
poor. 
Meanwhile, inequality has been maintained or reinforced. Latin America has for a long time 
been the least equitable region in the developing world. And this feature has been further 
reinforced by the negative effects of the globalization process and the shortage of public 
resources originating in the adjustment programs inspired by the IMF, which have reduced the 
funds allocated to social policies. On average, in Latin America the poorest 10% of the 
population receives less than 2% of the National Income (from 1,8 to 1,9% depending on the 
year), while the wealthiest 10% receives more than 41% of it.  
The most extreme case is Brazil, the biggest country in the area, where the first decile barely 
tops 1% of total income, while the decile of the richest approaches 60% of total income.  
A significant increase in the social and productive heterogeneity of the biggest countries, 
which increases the internal difficulties among the main subnational groupings, is added to this. 
A recent report has spoken of “five Mexicos”
13
, while in Brazil one may trace a huge rectangle of 
poverty that stretches from the city of Fortaleza on the Atlantic, in the north, to Manaus in the 
interior of the Amazon, descends along the jungle to the latitude of the state of Minas Gerais, 
and heads towards the coast passing through Belo Horizonte and Vitoria. In the several million 
square kilometers encompassed by this space live some of the most wretched communities of 
the continent. The center and south Brazil, in the states of Rio de Janeiro, São Paulo, Curitiba, 
Santa Catarina or Rio Grande do Sul, on the other hand, is more modern and nuanced. 
Industrial power, services and latest-generation activities concentrate there. Like in Mexico, any 
set of social indicators shows differences that extend from 1 to 3 or more between the most 
prosperous states and the poorest ones.  
In the Latin America of today, the existence of several countries in the same national territory 
originates gigantic social tensions and very serious problems of governability.  
This is something that could also happen to those countries not homogeneously developed, 
such as Argentina, Chile, Colombia and Venezuela, among others. 
In a comparison of cases, the distance between Latin American nations is broader than it 
was fifty years ago. Homogeneity is now located in the subregions: Central America, the 
Caribbean, the Andean region or the Southern Cone, with Mexico –with all the complexities 
entailed by having a 3,200-km-long common border with the United States and an FTA that has 
concentrated more than 85% of foreign trade towards the north– as a region in itself. 
Since the end of the communist camp, the United States has inaugurated a less enthusiastic 
policy towards the countries to its south in the hemisphere. At some point the international 
expert and former Mexican foreign relations minister Bernardo Sepúlveda called these periods 
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“times of no policy toward Latin America”. This, as we have suggested, has been the case on 
many previous occasions. But this time the US’s lack of interest seems to have a more strategic 
horizon, unless a tremendous social catastrophe shakes the continent. Such a trend has been 
reinforced after the change in the international setting that followed the attacks on September 
11 2001
14
. As from then onwards, the struggle against terrorism and the preemptive actions 
against the states that presumably harbor it have been entirely dominant. This is a fairly remote 
setup as regards its impact in this region. Only the initial concerns, later ruled out, about the 
possible existence of radical Islamic bands in Ciudad del Este and on the triple border among 
Paraguay, Argentina and Brazil, or the sealing of the Mexican border in the north and south of 
its territory, are connected to that setup. The rest involves the critical situation in Colombia and 
the actions undertaken by its government against the armed organizations FARC and ELN and 
the organizations of cocaine traffickers, regarding which the Pentagon promotes the Colombia 
Plan, or the possible reemergence of the Sendero Luminoso in Peru, which might originate 
equivalent actions. The remainder lies beyond central US concerns and priorities, even though 
dramatic situations such as the Argentine disorders of December 2001 or the increase in 
squalor in Central America switch on the alarm system, threatening increases in political conflict 
and social explosions. 
This explains the fact that many significant things are happening without the United States 
paying much attention. For the first time the new Brazilian government of Luis Inácio Lula da 
Silva gives access to power to a clearly left-wing force such as the Workers’ Party. In Argentina, 
the new head of state, Néstor Kirchner, surprises observers with radical measures that 
reorganize the judiciary, combat corruption and repeal the “full stop” laws in the field of human 
rights. In Uruguay, the Frente Amplio and its leader Tabaré Vázquez garner over 50% of 
preferences just a year before the upcoming presidential elections, threatening to put an end to 
almost a century and a half of hegemony by the traditional Blanco and Colorado Parties. Chile 
has been governed since March 2000 by Ricardo Lagos, a socialist president, and his sector 
has grown to be a majority within the coalition that displaced General Pinochet from power and 
leads the country since 1990. In El Salvador, many analysts believe that this time the governing 
ARENA party will be displaced from power and replaced by a candidate of the center-left or left. 
In Mexico, all the surveys that explore the trends ahead of the next elections in June 2006 give 
pride of place to the mayor of Mexico City, Andrés Manuel López Obrador, of the Democratic 
Revolution Party. 
Everything leads to the conclusion that in today’s Latin America what is happening within it is 
more important than its relations with the United States, and that Washington has little time left 
in which to pay attention to the new, emerging setting. 
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